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In her paper about power relations between participants in argumentative
interactions, Professor Kloster addresses an issue that is immensely important and
relevant to the study and practice of argumentation. Imbalances of power between
arguers often explain why argumentative exchanges go wrong and create conditions
that are counterproductive to good argumentation. I also appreciate the normative
approach evidenced in the aim: “to remedy improper uses of power” (p. 9). At the
same time, Kloster’s way of approaching power from her logical view of
argumentation is somewhat alien to my rhetorical way of thinking.
As
commentator, let me at once add that I am not acquainted with the fields of inquiry
and the literature that the paper refers to and proceeds from. Being in a position
where I – to use the terminology of the paper – need to be ‘leveled up’, the
comments have the character of questions rather that expert comments on the
paper’s own terms.
In the first sections of her paper, Kloster suggests that argumentation theory
may reach valuable insights by turning to negotiation theory, which is described as
“years ahead” of argumentation when it comes to investigating power relations
between parties involved in the interaction (p. 2). The introduction to this line of
inquiry on the following pages is informative and illuminative, and Kloster
convincingly gets the message across that looking at negotiations may yield fruitful
insights about argumentation in general. However, in the comparison between
negotiation and argumentation I encounter a need for clarification. It strikes me the
two terms in the comparison are not on par. Negotiation is defined as a practice or
kind of discourse “which may include argumentation and may rely on reason”. The
word ‘argumentation’ here must be understood as referring to a broad notion on a
higher level of abstraction than ‘negotiation’. But if negotiation is a practice
subsumed under argumentation, how can they at the same time be compared as two
parallel kinds of practice? Is Kloster saying that negotiation and argumentation
overlap? Or does she, in using the comparison, imply a certain type of argumentative
practice? (Cf. Walton, 1992, p. 95) It seems to me that the latter is the case and that
the specific kind of argumentation in the comparison is indicated by the term
“rational persuasion”. What in turn this expression refers to is indicated by the
description of argumentation as “the practice of presenting, evaluating, and revising
arguments with the aim of assenting only to conclusions which have been
adequately supported” (p. 2).
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My own paper for this conference concerns the relations and interplay
between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. Having this in the back of my mind while
preparing the commentary, I was inclined to consider the paper in this perspective.
In this connection, Kloster’s paper exemplifies the fact that investigations within
these fields of course do not exclude integration of other research traditions, in this
case negotiation theory and feminist studies. Apart from this, how does her paper fit
in within the three traditional fields of argumentation? Firstly, Kloster repeatedly
identifies herself as a logician, underscoring for instance that her purpose is not a
question of “abandoning the standards of logical reasoning” (p. 9), referring to
informal logic, I assume. Secondly, her paper incorporates approaches associated
with the dialectical tradition by focusing on turn-taking communicative situations.
Thirdly, the paper includes some elements that point in the direction of rhetoric, for
instance the term ‘persuasion’ to identify the aim of arguing. When it comes to the
legitimacy of persuasive appeals, the picture becomes blurred: On the one hand,
Kloster seemingly maintains a traditional logical view that privileges rational
appeals and reject emotional appeals; on the other hand, her proposal to make room
for narratives in argumentative settings may be seen as an opening towards the
acceptability of ethos and pathos.
In this connection, I have some reservations concerning the concept of rational
argumentation. ‘Rational persuasion’ may sound like a contradiction in terms, and it
seems unclear whether Kloster uses the notion of rationality in a narrow or broad
sense? At the outset of the paper, she distances herself from “rational argument” –
or worse, “the rationalist model of […] logical reasoning” – identifying it with “a
masculine, westernized ideal of objective reasoning” and norms and privileges
enjoyed by especially well-educated and well-off white males (p.1). However, the
paper on the whole leaves the reader with the impression that she carries this
rather restricted rational norm with her in the baggage. If we understand rationality
in the broader sense of reasonableness and rephrase the ideal of argumentation as
‘reasonable persuasion’, this would be a significant improvement from my point of
view (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Toulmin, 2001).
Another question relates to theories of consensus vs. dissensus. That Kloster
identifies with the consensus view is evidenced several times in the paper; for
instance, she describes the goal of argumentation as “the successful resolution of a
disagreement” (p. 6). On the other hand, the inclusion of negotiation theory presents
a move towards the acceptability of reasonable disagreement, a move that I
welcome.
The final comments concern the issue of the so-called status quo fallacy. It is
described as “power-blindness” consisting in a “comfortable ignorance, on the part
of those who fit the current norms, of the difficulties faced by those who are
disadvantaged.” The fallacy is committed, explains Kloster, when privileged
communicators “assume that everyone can read, […] get a job”, etc. This reminded
me of the anecdote about the judge who reproached the poor, starving thief, saying:
When I go home from work, I am hungry too, but I don’t steal! Now, is this really a
fallacy? I agree that such examples reveal lacking social and communicative skills as
well as empathy in general, but find that categorizing them as a fallacy is stretching
the notion of fallacy too far.
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I fail to see the status quo power-blindness as a fallacy because, to my way of
thinking, this term is closely related to how one argues and should not be extended
to one’s conceptions of who one argues with, or to other factors that surround the
argumentative interaction. Thus, I cannot follow Kloster when she insists that they
should be treated as “a problem in the argument itself: the use of premises which
are either not acceptable or not sufficient to establish the conclusion.” (p. 8)
Moreover, I cannot see how this is demonstrated in the paper. Most of the examples
concern discourse that seeks to prepare participants to enter argumentation by
equalizing them. Nowhere in the paper does Kloster provide examples that show
how ignorance of power-imbalances between the parties appears in the arguments
themselves, or that such ignorance can be used abusively in premises, which are
unacceptable or insufficient to establish the conclusion.
However, this objection does not mean that I am blind to the problem of
power-blindness. Kloster is right in drawing attention to it. As I read the paper, the
kind of discursive practice that she is concerned with is argumentation in
educational contexts, typically problems that arise in classroom settings. In turn, the
main point, as I understand it, is that in various situations of this educational kind
one must face the problem that the differences in powers may be too many and too
big for argument even to get started. In such cases one must of course do something
to equalize power. To ignore imbalances, projecting one’s own competences and
norms onto those who do not share them, is indeed counterproductive.
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